The Banking Shuffle: Barring the Reordering of Consumer Transactions and Other Recommendations by Edwards, Tanisha M.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 14
3-1-2016
The Banking Shuffle: Barring the Reordering of
Consumer Transactions and Other
Recommendations
Tanisha M. Edwards
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tanisha M. Edwards, The Banking Shuffle: Barring the Reordering of Consumer Transactions and Other Recommendations, 20 N.C.
Banking Inst. 253 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol20/iss1/14
The Banking Shuffle: Barring the Reordering of 
Consumer Transactions and Other Recommendations 
I. INTRODUCTION
Banks have been doing the shuffle.  Not on the dance floor, but 
with consumer transactions.  By shuffling transactions and processing 
them largest to smallest, rather than chronologically, banks increase the 
number of overdraft fees consumers pay.1  Imagine a consumer had $100 
in her checking account and made several purchases throughout the day.  
The consumer started the day off with a $5 cup of coffee, paid $50 for a 
phone bill, $40 for gas, and, with only $5 remaining in her account, $100 
for groceries.  For the last transaction, the consumer accepted the $34 
overdraft fee2 for the single transaction that created a negative balance.  
However, if instead of processing the transactions in chronological order, 
the bank were to debit her account for the $100 transaction first, the 
consumer must accept three overdraft fees—paying the bank $105 in 
overdraft fees instead of $35.  This is the banking shuffle and banks 
should be barred from this practice.3 
Consumer lawsuits against banks for wrongful overdraft charges 
from overdraft protection programs have prompted the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to consider new regulations aimed 
at overdraft fees.4  Although consumers can benefit from their bank or 
credit union covering an important payment that may have otherwise 
1. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Big Banks Have Been Gaming Your Overdraft Fees to
Charge You More Money, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 17, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/17/wells-fargo-to-make-changes-
to-protect-customers-from-overdraft-fees/.
2. CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU: NEWSROOM (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-finds-small-debit-purchases-lead-to-
expensive-overdraft-charges/ (finding $34 median overdraft free). 
3. See id.  (noting nonprofits are “pressing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
to write rules to require all banks to end high-to-low reordering”). 
4. See Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. 12031, 12031 (Feb.
28, 2012) (addressing concerns about overdraft protection programs); Douglas-Gabriel, supra 
note 1 (noting consumer lawsuits exposed wrongful overdraft charge practices and the 
CFPB’s attention to the issue). 
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bounced, overdraft programs still have “the capacity to inflict serious 
economic harm on [consumers].”5  The economic harm can result from 
banks shuffling transactions, leading to more overdraft fees, or from 
banks charging high fees for accessing the overdraft service.6 
The CFPB’s purpose is “to implement and, where applicable, 
enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of 
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial 
products and services and that markets for consumer financial products 
and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”7  After analyzing the 
statutory standards of fairness, transparency, and competition, this Note 
concludes that the CFPB should prohibit banks from reordering consumer 
transactions.8  In meeting its purpose, the CFPB should promote 
consumer economic freedom by forcing banks to chronologically order 
consumer transactions and creating more transparency of overdraft 
programs.9  Assuming that a consumer knows and understands the risk of 
overdraft protection programs,10 overly restrictive policies on overdraft 
fees would negatively affect consumer choice and the banking industry’s 
bottom lines particularly in small financial institutions.11 
5. Gary Stein, Comment Period on Overdrafts Extended to June 29, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU: BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/comment-
period-on-overdrafts-extended-to-june-29/. 
6. See id. (noting the CFPB is monitoring risks posed by overdraft protection programs
to make informed decisions for regulation). 
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012); see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, About Us, (Aug. 19, 
2015) [hereinafter CFPB About Us], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ 
(describing CFPB’s functions). 
8. See Jeff Bater, CFPB Flexes Enforcement Power To Attack Bad Practices, 105
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 386 (Sept. 18, 2015) (“[C]oming rules could require better 
disclosures and bar banks from reordering transactions in a way that triggers overdrafts.”). 
9. See, e.g., Eric Grover, A New Congress, A New Chance To Rein In the CFPB, AM. 
BANKER, Jan. 13, 2015 (determining that the CFPB is administrative law on steroids because 
the agency is creating laws, a power given to Congress). 
10. While the CFPB study did not contain consumers directly identifying personal
information, the CFPB plans further studies on how overdraft works and how it is affecting 
consumers.  CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra 
note 2.  Additionally, a 2014 Pew Charitable Trust study found more than half of the people 
who overdrew their checking accounts at an ATM in the past year didn’t remember consenting 
to the overdraft service.  Heather Long, Overdraft Fees Top $1 Billion at the Big 3 Banks, 
CNN MONEY (May 27, 2015 12:11 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/27/investing/overdraft-fees-over-1-billion-big-banks/.  Pew 
Charitable Trust is a foundation that conducts research.  PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, MISSION & 
VALUES, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/mission-and-values. 
11. Smaller banks have become heavily reliant on overdraft fees to make money, such
as Woodforest National Bank in Texas.  Long, supra note 10; Falling Overdraft Takes a Bite 
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This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II presents background 
information on overdraft protection programs and the corresponding 
regulation.12  Part III discusses the pre-CFPB data and current data on 
overdraft protection programs.13  It also contends that the CFPB needs 
more data to avoid issuing a premature rulemaking.14  With fairness, 
transparency, and competition in mind, Part IV examines the overdraft 
protection program issues likely to be tackled in any rulemaking.15  Part 
V identifies the practical implications of proposed regulations and 
concludes that transaction reordering should be barred.16 
II. OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND THEIR REGULATION
Banks offer overdraft programs as a service that imposes a fee on 
a consumer’s account when the consumer spends or withdraws more 
money than is available.17  Before automated overdraft systems, banks 
would manually review a customer’s account and, as a courtesy, pay 
insufficient funds based on the institution’s relationship with the 
customer.18  This process saved the customer from the embarrassment of 
having to pay a bounced check fee to the check payee by instead paying 
an overcharge directly to the bank.19  The inefficient system of manual 
review was replaced by automated overdraft systems.20  Banks continued 
the courtesy payment for bounced checks known as non-sufficient funds 
(“NSF”) until Regulation E was amended in 2010 requiring banks to 
Out Of Banks’ Bottom Line, CONSUMER BANKERS ASS’N (June 17, 2015), 
http://consumerbankers.com/cba-media-center/cba-news/falling-overdraft-takes-bite-out-
banks%E2%80%99-bottom-line (“Overdraft fee revenue accounts for a greater share of 
revenue at banks with less than $1 billion in assets.”); see also Annamaria Andriotis & Peter 
Rudegeair, Banks Feel Pinch From Declining Overdraft Fees, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2015 
6:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-feel-pinch-from-declining-overdraft-fees-
1434493786 (noting that banks have been forced to find additional revenue or make cuts, such 
as personnel reductions or bank closures, to make up for the losses of overdraft revenue). 
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Dan Rutherford, Consumer Advisory: You’ve Got Options When It Comes to
Overdraft, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU: BLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/category/overdrafts/. 
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receive customer permission before charging a fee.21  Thus, the customer 
had the choice to opt-in to an overdraft protection program.22  In response 
to the customer opting out, the bank could decline to complete the 
transaction if the customer did not opt-in or, alternatively, the bank could 
pay the transaction as a free of charge courtesy.23  Currently, if a customer 
opts-in, banks generally charge an overdraft fee when a check is returned, 
when the overdraft service is used, and when an overdraft is not repaid 
on time.24 
The Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”)25 undertook initial 
regulation of overdraft protection programs before the CFPB was 
created.26  No agency had exclusive control over consumer financial 
protection regulation since it was divided among several government 
agencies.27  The FRB remained in charge of enforcing Regulation E until 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) transferred the responsibility of consumer issues to 
the CFPB.28  The CFPB was given the power to “regulate the offering 
and provision of consumer financial products or services under the 
federal consumer financial laws.”29 
The CFPB’s goals include: (1) “prevent[ing] financial harm to 
consumers while promoting good practices that benefit them”; (2) 
“empower[ing] consumers to live better financial lives”; and (3) 
“inform[ing] the public, policy makers, and the CFPB’s own policy-
21. Id. at 12032; Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12
C.F.R. § 1005.17(b) (2012).
22. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(b) (requiring opt-in).
23. See id.  (requiring that banks customers opt in to overdraft protection programs, not
that banks provide overdraft protection). 
24. Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 12033.
25. The Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) refers to the Board of the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. 
26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1061(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2012) (creating the CFPB in 2010); TODD BEAUCHAMP & 
LAWRENCE KAPLAN, PAUL HASTINGS, THE FED. RESERVE BD.’S FINAL RULE ON OVERDRAFT 
PROGRAMS: THE FINAL WORD? (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1474.pdf.  The FRB worked with other 
agencies to issue guidance for overdraft programs.  Id. 
27. Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 327 (2013). 
28. Dodd-Frank § 1061 (b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1).  Dodd-Frank also transferred the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency’s (“OCC”) authority over consumer issues to the CFPB.  Dodd-Frank § 1061(b)(2), 
(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(2), (4). 
29. Dodd-Frank § 1011(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).
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making with data-driven analysis of consumer finance markets and 
consumer behavior.”30  These goals serve as an internal initiative to meet 
the purpose, objectives, and functions set forth in Dodd-Frank.31 
The CFPB uses its inherited Regulation E in enforcement actions, 
specifically the opt-in requirement.32 CFPB’s enforcement on overdraft 
programs has preceded any formal rulemaking.33  On December 27, 2011, 
the CFPB published for comment an interim final rule that revised 
Regulation E.34  The interim final rule prohibited financial institutions 
from charging fees for transactions that overdraw an account by use of a 
debit card at an ATM and point-of-sale, unless the consumer opts-in to 
an overdraft protection program.35  Essentially, consumers have to opt-in 
to the overdraft program when the account is opened, and if they choose 
not to opt-in, the bank will deny the transaction in order to avoid an 
overdraft.36  Regulation E also outlines the requirements for overdraft 
protection programs regarding consumer transparency, disclosures on 
banking practices, and abuse of the program.37 
In 2012, the CFPB put out its Notice and Request for Information 
regarding the impacts of overdraft protection programs on consumers.38  
Overdraft protection programs first appeared on the CFPB regulatory 
agenda in fall 2013 and were anticipated to be under consideration from 
November 1, 2013 to October 31, 2014.39  Overdraft program research 
30. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2013 - FY 2017, 8 (2013).
While the CFPB has four goals, this Note focuses on the three goals that are geared toward 
consumers, unlike the fourth goal, which focuses on the CFPB’s internal performance.  Id. 
31. See Dodd-Frank § 1021(a)–(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)–(c) (describing the purpose,
objectives, and functions of the CFPB). 
32. Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(b)(1) (2012); see, e.g., Bob Sullivan, CFPB: Bank Charged $50M in Illegal 
Overdraft Fees, CREDIT.COM: PERS. FIN. (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://time.com/money/3839951/cfpb-regions-bank-charged-50m-illegal-overdraft-fees/ 
(noting the enforcement against Regions bank). 
33. Bater, supra note 8.
34. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17 (2012).
35. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b).  On November 17, 2009, prior to the CFPB’s amendment, the
FRB had published final regulations amending Regulation E to require banks to attain 
consumer permission before enrolling them in overdraft protection programs.  Id. 
36. Adam Levin, Banks Still Raking In the Profits from Overdraft Fees, CREDIT.COM
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://blog.credit.com/2012/10/banks-still-raking-in-the-profits-on-overdraft-
fees-62858/. 
37. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17.
38. Impacts of Overdraft Programs on Consumers, 77 Fed. Reg. 39, 12031, 12031 (Feb.
28, 2012). 
39. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 79 Fed. Reg. 4, 1242, 1242 (Jan. 7, 2014).
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continued to stay on the CFPB’s semiannual regulatory agenda until the 
Spring 2015 rulemaking agenda.40  In the Spring 2015 rulemaking 
agenda, the overdraft issue was in the pre-rule stage and focused on 
research to assess whether rulemaking was warranted.41  The overdraft 
issue has remained in the pre-rule stage since fall 2013, and the CFPB 
has continued to push back the final rule stage.42  In fact, the CFPB 
missed the proposed end date for pre-rule activities originally scheduled 
for October 2015.43  This could be due to the need for more data.44 
III. LACK OF DATA
Consumer behavior will influence whether a new rule on 
overdraft protection programs is needed.45  In meeting its goal to inform, 
the CFPB must first collect data on consumer behavior.46  Issues requiring 
research include recidivism,47 the impact of Regulation E’s opt-in 
requirement,48 and consumer need for the overdraft protection program.49  
Furthermore, the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) has identified 
inaccuracies in the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database 
(“Database”).50 
40. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 117, 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
41. 80 Fed. Reg. 117, at 35117.
42. 79 Fed. Reg. 4 at 1242 (ending pre-rule activities October  2014); OFFICE OF INFO. &
REG. AFF., 3170-AA42, SEMIANNUAL REG. AGENDA (Spring 2014) (ending pre-rule activities 
Feb. 2015); Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 79 Fed. Reg. 245, 76808, 76809 (Dec. 22, 2014) 
(noting continued research on overdraft programs); 80 Fed. Reg. 117 at 35117 (ending pre-
rule activities October 2015). 
43. Michael Ferullo, Rules on Payday Loans, Debt Collection, Mortgage Data Expected
in Busy 2015 for CFPB, 104 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 167 (Jan. 27, 2015); 80 Fed. Reg. 
117 at 35117. 
44. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 117, 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
45. 77 Fed. Reg. 39, 12031, 12032–33 (Feb. 28, 2012) (seeking information on overdraft
programs and “costs, benefits, and risks to consumers”). 
46. See id.
47. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: CHECKING ACCOUNT 
OVERDRAFT, 13 (July 2014) [hereinafter DATA POINT] (noting the causal relationship between 
opting-in, frequent overdrafts and the need for further study). 
48. See infra Part IV.
49. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, 58
(2013) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf 
(identifying transaction reordering by banks and other issues). 
50. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., Audit Report, 2015-FMIC-C-016, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST 
TO ENHANCE MANAGEMENT CONTROLS OVER THE CFPB’S CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATABASE 
(Sept. 10, 2015).  This is the current approach to data analysis.  Id.; The CPFB’s complaint 
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A. Pre-CFPB Data
A 2008 study published by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC Study”) determined that of the 1,171 FDIC-
supervised banks surveyed, 86% operated at least one formal overdraft 
program and 40.5% of all banks offered automated overdraft protection 
programs.51  Aligning with Regulation E, in 2010, the FDIC issued a final 
supervisory guidance providing guiding expectations with respect to 
overdraft protection programs.52 
B. Current Data
A 2013 white paper (“White Paper”) and a July 2014 report 
(“2014 Report”) summarized the CFPB’s current data on overdraft 
protection services.53  Although the CFPB planned to release the results 
of further research in October 2015, this data remains undisclosed.54 
The White Paper was comprised of data collected by the CFPB 
from a sampling of larger banks under the CFPB’s supervision.55  The 
data revealed that the average overdraft fee was $34 in 2012 and that most 
financial institutions provided some form of overdraft protection.56  The 
study also revealed that 44.7% of accounts that had more than ten 
overdraft items during the first six months of 2010 elected to opt-in by 
the end of that same year.57  Overdraft fees in 2015 were down 4% from 
2014, the largest drop since 2011.58  The decline in this source of fee 
income negatively affected banks’ bottom lines.59  Smaller banks will 
database can be found here: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase. 
51. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS at III,
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2008). 
52. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-81-2010, OVERDRAFT PAYMENT PROGRAMS AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION FINAL OVERDRAFT PAYMENT SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Nov. 24, 
2010) [hereinafter GUIDANCE].  The guidance reaffirmed existing expectations and provided 
specific guidance with respect to automated overdraft payment programs.  Id.; see also FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT PROGRAM SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter FAQ] (expanding clarification 
on potential issues financial institutions may face). 
53. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 4-7; DATA POINT, supra note 49, at 5.
54. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 117, 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
55. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 4.
56. Id. at 52–54.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Andriotis & Rudegeair, supra note 11.
59. Id.; Falling Overdraft Takes a Bite Out Of Banks’ Bottom Line, supra note 11.
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likely feel a greater impact from regulations aimed to deter consumers 
from using overdraft protection programs because the largest percent of 
their yearly earnings stem from overdraft fees.60 
Data from the 2014 Report revealed that nearly one in five 
consumers who opted-in to an overdraft protection program had more 
than ten overdrafts per year.61  It noted that consumers who opt-in for 
overdraft protection services incur the majority of their debit card 
overdraft fees on transactions of $24 or less.62  For example, small 
transactions, like a cup of coffee, can lead to expensive overdraft 
charges.63  With this in mind, the CFPB acknowledged that consumers’ 
personal needs and preferences influence their banking practices and 
thus, affect why accounts are overdrawn.64  Although the CFPB did not 
specifically disclose what these personal reasons were, the consumer 
complaint database provides personal examples of why consumers 
availed themselves of the overdraft service.65  For instance, a customer 
from Bank of America forgot about a written check that overdrew the 
account.66  Additionally, a SunTrust customer had a bill withdrawn two 
days earlier than the customer expected causing the overdraft protection 
service to take care of subsequent purchases.67 
In regards to transaction ordering, the CFPB found that debit 
60. See Neha Dimri & Richa Naidu, Regional U.S. Banks Face Hit From Looming
Overdraft Rules, REUTERS (June 9, 2015, 1:54 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/09/usa-banks-overdrafts-
idUSL3N0YU3QT20150609 (noting, for example, Louisiana-based South Bancorp Inc. gets 
about a fifth of its earnings per share from overdraft programs, while SunTrust—a larger 
bank—gets a tenth from overdraft fees). 
61. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 13.
62. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 18; CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to
Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra note 2. 
63. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 5.
64. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 62.
65. E.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPLAINT ID 1689631, Comment to
Consumer Complaints with Consumer Complaint Narratives (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter 
COMPLAINT ID 1689631], https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Consumer-Complaints-
with-Consumer-Complaint-Narrat/nsyy-je5y.  The consumer complaint database allows 
consumers to upload complaints about financial products and services, however, not all the 
facts alleged in the complaints are verified.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER
COMPLAINT DATABASE, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase. 
66. COMPLAINT ID 1689631, supra note 65.
67. CFPB, COMPLAINT ID 1682528, Comment to Consumer Complaints with Consumer
Complaint Narratives (Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter COMPLAINT ID 1682528], 
https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Consumer-Complaints-with-Consumer-Complaint-
Narrat/nsyy-je5y. 
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posting orders varied considerably from institution to institution.68  No 
two participants in the study followed the same posting order policies.69  
The data suggested that reordering transactions was a complex process 
that depended on the institution’s cutoff time for processing transactions, 
but the CFPB did identify the range of reordering approaches.70  If the 
CFPB can identify and comprehend the reordering approaches, the 
Agency can formulate a rule that is fair, transparent, and competitive, —
thereby helping consumers to understand the process and not be unaware 
of overdraft charges.71 
C. Critiques of the CFPB’s Data Collection
Based on current data, the economic harm to consumers enrolled 
in overdraft protection services does not stem from the banking industry, 
which has begun to self-police and adhere to regulations.72  The economic 
harm, rather, comes from the recidivism of a small group of consumers—
only 8.3% of bank customers incur nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees.73  
CFPB analysts determined that the evidence suggested that overdraft 
protection programs disproportionately impacted low-income and young 
consumers.74  Both the White Paper and the 2014 Report also show a 
disproportionate impact on low-income and young consumers but they 
have yet to identify the causes or determine whether the causes are 
material to potential regulation.75  Additionally, with only 8.3% of bank 
customers incurring nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees,76 it is difficult for 
the CFPB to prevent economic harm to this small group of consumers 
while promoting good practices that benefit everyone.77  It would be 
premature to regulate before data collection and analysis were complete. 
68. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 47.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 63; see generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2010) (emphasis added). 
72. Andriotis & Rudegeair, supra note 11.  For example, in 2014, Bank of America
Corporation launched a checking account that doesn’t allow customers to overdraw.  Id. 
73. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12 (finding 8.3% of bank customers incurring
nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees no matter the opt-in status). 
74. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 18.
75. Id.; DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 2.
76. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12.
77. Id.
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Additionally, it is undisputed that data has shown Regulation E’s 
opt-in requirement has had an impact on consumer activity, but the extent 
of such impact is disagreed upon within the financial industry.78  The 
CFPB took steps to reconcile these differences by requesting information 
on the impacts of Regulation E and overdraft programs on consumers.79  
On one hand, a 2011 Consumer Bankers’ Association (“CBA”) survey of 
eighteen large banks, representing 40% of the consumer checking 
accounts at that time, found that only 16% of consumers had opted-in for 
overdraft protection coverage on ATM and debit card transactions.80  In 
contrast, as of March 2011, a Moebs survey (“Moebs Survey”)81 of one 
million nationwide checking accounts, indicated, “75[%] of consumers 
had opted in for such overdraft coverage.”82  Although the CFPB 
collected the information after the comment period closed on April 30, 
2012, the Agency has yet to reveal its findings on the disagreement.83  
Instead, the CFPB’s research on overdraft protection services remained 
on the rulemaking agenda through 2015.  84 
Similarly, disagreements on how consumers view overdraft 
protection services also exist between the financial industry and the 
CFPB.85  The financial industry views consumers that use overdraft 
78. Meredith Fuchs, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0007 at 5-6 (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/FR-Notice_Overdraft.pdf (identifying the 
discrepancy in survey data); but see Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Overdraft Fees Remain 
Flat (Mar. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Overdraft Fees Reamin Flat], 
http://moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/199/Default.aspx 
(studying the rate for overdrafts on debit cards and ATMs). 
79. See Fuchs, supra note 78 at 11–12.
80. Id. at 5–6.
81. Moebs $ervices – Economic Research and Consulting, MOEBS SER.,
http://moebs.com/.  Collecting “primary, empirical data about financial institutions’ services, 
pricing, operating expenses, and financial condition” since 1983.  Id. 
82. Fuchs, supra note 78, at 6; Over Draft Fees Remain Flat, supra note 78.
83. Fuchs, supra note 78, at 6.
84. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 80 Fed. Reg. 35116, 35117 (June 18, 2015).
85. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141 (2012).  Argues that “[t]he case for regulation in this area under 
traditional safety and soundness is exceedingly weak, and the evidence of harm that would 
justify action under a consumer protection rationale, such as evidence of a lack of consumer 
understanding of the product’s terms or prices, is nearly nonexistent.”  Todd J. Zywicki & 
Nick Tuszynski, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 13 ENGAGE 
84, 84 (2012) (“[t]he case for regulation in this area under traditional safety and soundness is 
exceedingly weak, and the evidence of harm that would justify action under a consumer 
protection rationale, such as evidence of a lack of consumer understanding of the product’s 
terms or prices, is nearly nonexistent.”).  But see Live From New York City!, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU: BLOG, 18:40-19:10 (Feb. 22, 2012), 
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services as either careless, or as non-traditional bank customers who 
know when their financial circumstances warrant using the overdraft 
protection program.86  In contrast, the CFPB believes overdraft users are 
unaware of the costs they are incurring and, rather than considering other 
options for dealing with periodic shortfalls, are too easily influenced to 
opt-in to the overdraft protection program.87  The Moebs Survey pointed 
out that “[t]he consumer views overdrafts as a safety net and not a penalty 
anymore.”88  Conversely, a 2012 Pew Focus Group revealed the belief, 
“banks depict overdraft policies as a protection when they’re actually 
seen by the consumers more as a way for the bank to collect additional 
fees.”89  Regulation E helped frame consumer behavior as an affirmative 
choice—either the consumer opts-in or not.90  However, because some 
data exists to support both opposing perspectives, conclusively 
determining the motivations behind consumer behavior has been, and 
remains, an extremely arduous task.91 
Furthermore, flaws in the Database, the current data-driven 
analysis of complaints on financial services and products, have the 
potential to deal a devastating blow to the CFPB’s credibility and purpose 
of identifying consumer behavior.92  Complaints to the Database come 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-new-york-city/. 
86. ALEX SHESHUNOFF MANAGEMENT, OVERDRAFT PROTECTION A GUIDE FOR BANKERS
11 (2003), http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/Compliance/ABAOverdraftGuide2003.pdf 
(revealing two views of bankers); see Tanaya Macheel, With CFPB Rules Forthcoming, 
Banks Make Strides on Overdrafts, AM. BANKER, Jan. 5, 2016 (“[B]anks now see overdrafts 
as a way to both develop future customers and serve the greater good.”). 
87. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Launches Inquiry into
Overdraft Practice (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-launches-inquiry-into-overdraft-practices/ (researching 
misleading information on consumers). 
88. Overdraft Fees Remain Flat, supra note 78.
89. Live From New York City!, supra note 85.  Susan Weinstock of Pew Charitable Trust
said this during a roundtable discussion with the CFPB director, industry representatives and 
consumer advocates.  Id. 
90. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b) (2010).
91. ALEX SHESHUNOFF MANAGEMENT, supra note 86.  But see Live From New York City!,
supra note 85. 
92. See Jason Oliva, MBA’s Stevens: Complaint Database Will Be CFPB’s ‘Undoing’,
REVERSE MORTG. DAILY (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://reversemortgagedaily.com/2015/09/29/mbas-stevens-complaint-database-will-be-
cfpbs-undoing/ (calling for a reform of the Database); see also David H. Stevens, A Complaint 
Database With Limited Credibility, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://davidhstevensblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/25/the-cfpbs-misleading-consumer-
database/ (failing to be transparent to consumers); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER
COMPLAINT DATABASE, supra note 65 (containing information for each complaint, including 
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from consumers, financial analysts, and bank management.93  The CFPB 
uses this data “to help supervise companies, enforce federal consumer 
financial laws, and write rules and regulations.”94  Flaws in the database 
can lead to unsupported regulations and unnecessary supervision when 
the complaints incorrectly identify consumer behavior because the CFPB 
does not verify the complaints.95  For instance, the OIG found several 
“noticeable inaccuracies” in the Database and flagged the Database as 
insufficient.96  Similarly, in 2013, critics were wary of the process for 
verifying consumer complaints in the Database and pointed out the 
potential for error and sampling bias.97  OIG claimed the inaccuracies 
were relatively small, but several groups have called for a complete audit 
of the practice because the comments are not filtered for actual regulatory 
violations but allow consumer frustrations.98  Though the CFPB does not 
verify the facts alleged in the complaints, it does confirm a commercial 
relationship.99 
Critics would argue that the Database is different from surveys 
revealing the percentage of consumers who opt in to overdraft protection 
programs—practically, however, the CFPB needs both types of data to 
the source of the complaint, the date of submission, the company the complaint was sent to, 
and the actions by the company to resolve the issue). 
93. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 50, at 3.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Compare id. (using the Database to create legislation), with Oliva, supra note 92
(permitting unverified complaints can create misinformed legislation). 
96. Id. at 13; see Letter from Wayne A. Abernathy, Exec. Vice Pres., Am. Bankers
Ass’n, to Mark Bialek, Inspector Gen., Off. of the Inspector Gen. (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/LetterstoCongress/Documents/LTC-
ConsCompDatabase2015Jan.pdf (arguing for an audit that examines the degree to which 
complaint data that are published relate to a legal or regulatory violations rather than 
consumer frustration). 
97. Daniel Carpenter & Patricia A. McCoy, Keeping Tabs on Financial Innovation:
Product Identifiers in Consumer Financial Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 195, 205 
(2013) (pointing out the shortcomings of the Database, Carpenter and McCoy argue that this 
data has the potential to be of error and bias in reporting without a better system of 
verification). 
98. See Abernathy, supra note 96 at 2; see also Stevens, supra note 92.  The American
Bankers Association (“ABA”) and Mortgage Brokers Association (“MBA”) call for 
government oversight of the CFPB’s Complaint Database.  Id. 
99. Richard Cordray, Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data 9 (Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, CFPB-2012-0023, Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_Final-Policy-Statement-Disclosure-of-
Consumer-Complaint-Data.pdf; see Narrative Scrubbing Standard 2-3 (Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/201503_cfpb_Narrative-Scrubbing-
Standard.pdf (screening and scrubbing complaints to eliminate personal information). 
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accurately understand consumer behavior.100  These testimonials 
highlight individuals’ actual experiences with banking services, as 
opposed to just numbers.101  For such personal testimonials to provide 
meaningful data for the CFPB, they need to be accurate and complete—
the OIG’s findings bring this accuracy into question.102 
IV. OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAM ISSUES
The CFPB will likely tackle several issues in future rulemaking 
regarding overdraft protection programs.103  Consumer groups advocate 
that future rulemaking should bar banks from shuffling consumer 
transactions,104 require disclosure of alternative overdraft protection,105 
cap the overdraft charge,106 and limit how frequently fees can be 
imposed.107  The CFPB can fulfill its statutory mandate through future 
rulemaking focused primarily on barring banks from shuffling consumer 
transactions and making changes to improve Regulation E through better 
disclosure requirements.108 
A. Fair
For an act to be fair, the act or practice should not be deceptive 
100. See Letter from Kate Larson, Regulatory Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to




 (urging the CFPB to publish accurate and verified data by creating an appeals process, 
eliminating bad faith complaints and eliminating inquiries). 
101. See Consumer Complaint Database, supra note 65.
102. Id.
103. See Ferullo, supra note 43 (focusing on issues such as transaction reordering and
overdraft opt-in disclosures); see also Carter Dougherty, Banks’ Billions in Overdraft Fees 
Seen Dodging Tough U.S. Rules, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 6, 2015 5:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-05/banks-billions-in-overdraft-fees-seen-
dodging-tough-regulations (determining the CFPB will likely propose regulations in early 
2016). 
104. Bater, supra note 8; see infra, Part IV. A.1.
105. Dougherty, supra note 103.
106. See infra, Part IV. C.1.
107. See infra, Part IV. C.2.
108. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010) (mandating fair, transparent, and competitive financial
services) (emphasis added).
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or abusive.109  Dodd-Frank specified that the CFPB can only declare acts 
and practices as unfair if, “the act or practice causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”110  A practice is 
abusive if the CFPB finds that the act or practice “materially interferes 
with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a 
consumer financial product or service or that it takes unreasonable 
advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to avoid the 
problem, or reasonable reliance.”111 
Opponents of overdraft protection programs argue that overdraft 
protection programs are unfair because they disproportionately hurt 
lower income people112 and the fees are excessive when compared to the 
annual interest rate of a loan.113  While these statements are true, 
according to Richard Cordray, the Director of the CFPB, the question is 
whether “current overdraft practices are causing the kind of consumer 
harm that the federal consumer protection laws are designed to 
prevent.”114  The banking shuffle is that kind of harm.  Barring banks 
from high to low reordering of debit card transactions will slightly change 
the overdraft program but will still allow consumers access to the service.  
The CFPB must weigh consumer benefits against potential abuse.115 
109. See CFPB About Us, supra note 7.  Under new Regulation E requirements, “[a]ny
steering activity with respect to credit products raises potential legal issues, including fair 
lending, and concerns about unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAPs), among others, and 
will be closely scrutinized.”  GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 5. 
110. Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of Consumer
Financial Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 105 (2011) (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 
1031(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)). 
111. Id.; Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
112. Michael Corkery, Regulators Still Find Problems in Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2014, 3:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/regulators-still-find-
problems-in-overdraft-fees/?_r=0; see also FDIC, FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT
PROGRAMS, supra note 51, at V. 
113. “[I]f a consumer borrowed $24 for three days and paid the median overdraft fee of
$34, such a loan would carry a 17,000 percent annual percentage rate (APR).”  CFPB Finds 
Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra note 2; see also Corkery, 
supra note 112 (discussing how overdraft fees can be an expensive form of debt). 
114. Corkery, supra note 112.
115. See Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial
Protection Act’s “Abusive Standard”, J. OF CONSUMER & COM. L., 
http://www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/V14N3/V14N3_Dodd-Frank.pdf (“[T]he abusive standard 
itself may be subject to abuse if the Bureau uses it to ban products or practices that would 
have been helpful to consumers.”). 
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While opponents might argue that consumers could reasonably 
avoid overdraft fees by not opting-in to the overdraft protection program, 
thus making the banking practice fair,116  this is not the case.  Reordering 
consumer transactions causes “substantial injury” because the process 
manipulates the order of transactions to boost overdraft fees.117  The opt-
in requirement only partially mitigates this unfair practice because 
consumers have to show consent by opting-in.118  However, regardless of 
whether the consumer intends to overdraft, harm occurs when a consumer 
is surprised by extra charges on her account.119  The surprise results from 
the high fees that are added to the account when the bank orders the 
transactions in complex posting orders instead of simple chronological 
order.120  The element of consent does not outweigh the unfairness to 
consumers, who are held liable for understanding this complex posting 
process when even the CFPB is just now beginning to understand the 
process’s effect on consumers.121 
The CFPB should find that high to low ordering is abusive; and 
therefore an unfair practice under Dodd-Frank.  The CFPB’s data 
revealed that posting orders varied widely across the financial markets 
with combinations ranging from comingled high to low,122 sub-batched 
high to low,123 and chronological order.124  The process is even more 
complex with posting orders categorized by debit type, transaction size, 
and time stamp.125  Some consumers may understand this convoluted 
posting process, but for those who do not, banks have the ability to exploit 
a consumer’s lack of understanding, inability to avoid the problem, and 
116. See Ferullo, supra note 43 (“They [consumers] know what they are doing and have
every right to get out the product after opting-in.”). 
117. Dougherty, supra note 103.
118. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(b) (2012). 
119. CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft Charges, supra
note 2.  “Overdraft fees should not be ‘gotchas’ when people use their debit cards.”  Id. 
120. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 44–47.
121. Id.
122. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 45–46.  Comingling high to low is the process of
combining different types of debits into one single batch and then processing them from the 
highest amount to the smallest amount.  Id.  Types of debit include check, ACH (automated 
clearinghouse), ATM and point-of-sale.  Id. at 45. 
123. Id. at 46.  Sub-batching is the process of combining the debits together, such as
comingling, then separating the debits by type before processing them.  Id.  Banks can process 
one sub-batch high to low and another sub-batch low to high.  Id. 
124. Id. at 47.
125. Id. at 46.
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reliance on the overdraft protection program to increase profitability.126  
The burden should be on the banks to simplify the process so consumers 
can truly understand the terms.127 
For example, Wells Fargo simplified its posting order by posting 
transactions in the order received, and if any transactions are received at 
the same time, the bank posts from low to high.128  This change in policy 
occurred shortly after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found Wells Fargo’s high to low processing fraudulent and 
ordered the bank to pay customers $203 million in restitution.129  Other 
big players in the financial industry have also changed their practices in 
the face of public scrutiny: Bank of America eliminated overdrafts at the 
point-of-sale in 2011 and JPMorgan Chase assesses no overdraft fees for 
transactions under five dollars.130  Bank of America started asking their 
customers about the bank’s current overdraft practices and the study 
revealed customers disliked being charged for spending money they don’t 
have, thus leading to the elimination of the service at the point-of-sale.131  
As for JPMorgan Chase, the bank changed its posting policy in 2009 
following a lawsuit filed in the same year.132  The claim in the lawsuit 
was that the high to low policy was “unfair, deceptive and 
unconscionable,” but the case settled before the court made a ruling.133 
Although banks have made changes, the financial industry lacks 
a uniform policy and many banks still continue to employ unfair overdraft 
126. Id. (finding it difficult to determine what process the bank is using).
127. See, e.g., Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1 (revealing that Wells Fargo ended its
practice of reordering). 
128. Id.; see also A Guide to Your Common Checking Account Fees 2, WELLS FARGO
BANK, https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/personal/checking/fees/value-
NV.pdf?https://www.wellsfargo.com/assets/pdf/personal/checking/fees/value-NV.pdf  (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2016) (outlining its banking fees for checking accounts). 
129. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 704 F.3d 712, 725–726 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 589 F.
App’x 824 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding restitution); see also Andrew Martin & Ron Lieber, 
Wells Fargo Loses Ruling on Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/business/11wells.html?_r=0 (losing case). 
130. Halah Touryalai, Yes, Banks Are Reordering Your Transactions And Charging
Overdraft Fees, FORBES (June 11, 2013 3:54 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/06/11/yes-banks-are-reordering-your-
transactions-and-charging-overdraft-fees/. 
131. Live From New York City!, supra note 85, at 27:30–28:24.
132. David Voreacos & Laurence Viele Davidson, JPMorgan Agrees to Pay $110 Million
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policies.134  According to Pew research, “[o]f the 44 big banks reviewed 
by researchers, 51[%] did not engage in high-to-low reordering, 
compared to 46[%] in 2013.”135  Banks’ motivation to change their 
overdraft policies is insufficient, and therefore further regulation is 
necessary.136  Thus far, motivation to change overdraft practices has 
largely been derived from “legal battles, arm-twisting by consumer 
advocacy groups[,] and financial penalties from regulators.”137  Instead 
of making consumers wait on long legal battles and regulatory penalties, 
the CFPB should categorically prohibit the banking shuffle for the good 
of the consumer and banking industry.138 
The counter-argument in support of high to low ordering is that it 
ensures that major bills like mortgage and credit card payments will be 
paid for the benefit of the consumer.139  But this creates the problem of 
holding banks responsible for understanding the motivations behind each 
and every transaction made by the customer.140  The potential abuse by 
banks controlling the order of transactions outweighs the consumer 
benefit.141  Instead of imposing this responsibility on the bank, the 
consumer should be responsible for keeping track of their spending order.  
Furthermore, by paying the consumer’s highest bill first, the bank is 
taking away the primary insulation that a person has to prevent them from 
over drafting multiple times on smaller amounts.142 
134. See Checks and Balances: 2014 Update, THE PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2014/04/09/checks-and-
balances-2014-update (charting and examining the overdraft services of different banks in the 
U.S.).
135. Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1.
136. See id. (revealing no uniform practice).
137. Macheel, supra note 86; see also Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1.
138. Macheel, supra note 86; see Dougherty, supra note 104 (“The unfair, deceptive and
abusive nature of bank overdrafts calls for deliberate, strong action by the CFPB.”) (internal 
citation marks omitted). 
139. Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 1.
140. Sheshunoff, supra note 86, at 19 (stating that conclusively determining the
motivations behind consumer behavior a difficult task that still has not been determined); 
supra Part III. 
141. See Lee, supra note 115, at 119 (“[T]he abusive standard itself may be subject to
abuse if the Bureau uses it to ban products or practices that would have been helpful to 
consumers.”). 
142. Id.
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B. Transparent
The opt-in requirement is too lenient on disclosing alternative 
options for consumers and increasing disclosure requirements will better 
serve the goal of promoting transparent practices.  Transparency concerns 
arise from banks not revealing alternative options to overdraft services 
and from the ambiguous way banks promote the opt-in requirement.143 
To resolve disclosure issues, Congress gave the CFPB the direct 
authority to conduct a trial disclosure program “if limited in time and 
scope, subject to specified standards and procedures, and for the purpose 
of providing trial disclosures to consumers that are designed to improve 
upon [forms].”144  The CFPB issued a notice for comment and request to 
collect public feedback on its proposed model disclosure form associated 
with overdraft protection programs.145 
One recommendation to further transparency is to change the 
language of Regulation E’s provision requiring the disclosure of 
alternative plans for covering overdrafts from permissive to 
mandatory.146 Currently, “[a]n institution may, but is not required to, list 
additional alternatives for the payment of overdrafts.”147  The CFPB has 
listed alternatives to the overdraft service, but the goal of promoting good 
financial practices is only met halfway.148  Other options for customers 
include opting out of overdraft protection programs anytime, tracking 
their balance carefully, signing up for low balance alerts, and shopping 
around for a different account.149  These options are also highlighted on 
the CFPB website and are fair practices that could be implemented by 
banks, thereby giving consumers a choice to ensure they avoid deceptive 
and abusive practices.150  The CFPB needs to ensure banks actually 
inform consumers of these options to meet the agency’s goal of 
143. See e.g., Regions Bank, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU No. 2015-CFPB-0009 (Apr.
28, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201504_cfpb_consent-order_regions-bank.pdf. 
144. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1032(e)(1); 12 U.S.C. § 5332(e)(1) (2010). 
145. Comment Request, Web-Based Quantitative Testing of Point of Sale/ATM
(POS/ATM) Overdraft Disclosure Forms, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0037 (Sept. 4, 2015). 




149. Rutherford, supra note 17.
150. Id.
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promoting transparent practices.151 
Additionally, the FDIC recommended enhancing periodic 
statements and employing a targeted outreach approach as two ways of 
demonstrating the FDIC’s guidance on follow-up action.152  The CFPB 
should combine both ways to provide important information to frequent 
users and to dispel the notion that they are misinformed.153  Institutions 
can employ different approaches to meet this recommendation, but the 
purpose is to target and monitor the recidivists154 in order to meet the 
CFPB’s goal of educating consumers.155  An “enhancement” could mean 
including a message on the periodic statement that describes how the 
customer could contact the institution to discuss alternative options with 
a knowledgeable customer service representative.156 
One way to accomplish a targeted outreach approach is through 
undertaking “meaningful and effective follow-up:”157 
Meaningful and effective . . .  means that the institution 
has made reasonable efforts to provide the customer with 
information on alternatives to overdraft payment 
programs that may be better-suited to the individual’s 
need for short-term credit, as well as a clear mechanism 
for the customer to avail himself or herself of those 
alternatives.158 
Follow-up action includes contacting the customer personally, 
informing the customer of available alternatives, and financial 
151. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 30 (meeting CFPB
goals). 
152. GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 1.
153. Id.
154. FAQ, supra note 52, at 3 (“The institution should be able to demonstrate that it
monitors account usage, undertakes programs designed to address excessive or chronic use, 
and monitors its success in informing frequent users of overdraft payment programs of the 
high cumulative costs of the program.”) 
155. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 30, at 10–11.
156. FAQ, supra note 52, at 6 (“For example, the following statement could be used: ‘You
have been paying multiple overdraft fees and there may be cheaper alternative products that 
may be better suited for your needs.  Please call [name of employee] at xxx-xxx-xxxx to 
discuss other options with a customer service representative or visit us at your local 
branch.’”). 
157. FAQ, supra note 52, at 5; see Guidance, supra note 52, at 3.
158. FAQ, supra note 52, at 2.
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counseling.159  The 2014 Study determined nearly one in five consumers 
accessed the overdraft service more than ten times per year.160 
Furthermore, 82.3% of accounts incur three or fewer overdrafts a year, 
leaving a smaller targeted number of customers.161  Because of this, the 
CFPB should require banks to personally contact the consumer after the 
fourth overdraft fee per year.  This follow-up requirement will positively 
affect consumers’ choice to opt-in by ensuring consumers know and 
understand the financial consequences of overdrafts while allowing them 
the personal choice to overdraft as many times as they please.162 
“Under this [combined] approach, it would be reasonable for an 
institution to continue to send enhanced periodic statements to a customer 
for as long as the customer continues chronic or excessive usage.”163  This 
idea complements the recommendation of requiring banks offering 
overdraft services to reveal all possible options.164  The goal is to help 
consumers make informed decisions when faced with many options to 
manage the need for short-term credit.165 
Transparency concerns also exist about the manner in which 
some institutions present the opt-in option to their existing checking 
account customers.166  The Birmingham, Alabama-based Regions Bank 
administrative case167 provides a perfect example of how vigilant 
159. GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 4.
160. This does depend on the banks overdraft protection program charging for the number
of transactions or the number of overdraft fees incurred by the same transaction.  WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 49, at 44 (varying overdraft practices). 
161. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12 (finding, additionally, that 8.3% of bank
customers incur nearly 73.7% of all overdraft fees no matter the opt-in status). 
162. FAQ, supra note 52, at 6; GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 3.  For example, if a consumer
overdraws his or her account on more than six occasions where a fee is charged in a rolling 
twelve-month period, the bank must undertake meaningful and effective follow-up.  Id. 
163. FAQ, supra note 52, at 6.
164. See Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. §
1005.17(d)(5) (2012) (recommending banks that offer overdraft services to provide 
alternative options to the consumer). 
165. See FAQ, supra note 52, at 4 (urging banks to inform excessive users of alternative
options other than overdraft services); GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 6 (recommending 
personally contacting consumers to help inform consumers of all the options to financial 
services). 
166. Fuchs, supra note 78, at 5–6; CTR. FOR RESP. LENDING, BANKS COLLECT OVERDRAFT
OPT-INS THROUGH MISLEADING MARKETING, 2 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/policy-legislation/regulators/CRL-OD-
Survey-Brief-final-2-4-25-11.pdf. 
167. Regions Bank, supra note 143.
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oversight of Regulation E can help create more transparent markets.168 
The CFPB, in its role as enforcer of Regulation E, realized that Regions 
continued charging a subset of customers’ overdraft fees pursuant to 
overdraft protection plans without their express consent.169  After finding 
that Regions did not follow the opt-in regulation, it was fined $7.5 million 
and forced to reimburse all adversely affected customers.170  The 
aforementioned recommendations will police banks in their promotion 
and provide transparency to consumers. 
C. Competitive
In fulfilling its purpose, the CFPB must also ensure that markets 
for consumer financial products and services are competitive.171  The test 
is to weigh the substantial injury to consumers against free market access 
and innovation.172  If the balance weighs in favor of competition (i.e. free 
market access and innovation), the consumer financial product or service 
passes the test.173 
1. A Cap on the Amount Charged for Overdraft Fees
Capping fees will fail the competitive test and should not be 
implemented in future regulation.  The opt-in requirement mitigates the 
need for a cap because not only do consumers have to show consent by 
opting in, but also consumers are informed as to how much they will be 
charged for each overdraft fee.174  According to Regulation E, the 
institution must disclose the maximum fee that may be imposed.175  
Banks must ask consumers if they wish to enroll in an overdraft 
protection program and they must provide an explanation of the 
168. Sullivan, supra note 32 (discussing strict enforcement of Regulation E and its effect
on banks and consumers). 
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
172. Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(B); §1021(a), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5511(a).
173. Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(B).
174. Electronic Fund Transfers (“Regulation E”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R.
§ 1005.17(d) (2012).
175. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(d)(3).
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program.176  The burden should be on the consumer to read and remember 
how much the bank charges for overdrafts before opting-in. Capping fees 
would hurt the free market because the different services banks provide 
allow consumers to choose the best bank for their particular needs.177 
Some opponents of overdraft protection programs argue for a cap 
on the maximum fee charged, but others view such an approach as too 
paternalistic.178  Consumers have the option to search for a bank that fits 
their needs and charges a fee they are willing to pay.179  For those enrolled 
in an overdraft protection program, the median overdraft fee rose to $36 
in 2015.180  However, the CFPB study determined per-item fees ranged 
from a low of $10 to a high of $45.181 Without the cap, consumers have 
the option to switch to banks that have a de minimis waiver such as J.P. 
Morgan, or a lower overdraft fee.182 
2. Limitations on the How Frequently Fees Can Be Imposed
The CFPB will likely not include a regulation limiting how 
frequently fees can be imposed.183  The CFPB study revealed a broad 
range of fee frequencies.184  The lowest number of overdraft and NSF 
fees that were charged in a day was two and the highest number was 
twelve.185  With this in mind, consumers have the option to search around 
before choosing a bank.186  Instead of limiting the frequency of fees, the 
176. Regulation E, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.17(d).
177. Richard Barrington, Protection Racket: A Wake-Up Call On Overdraft Fees, FORBES
(June 26, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2013/06/26/protection-
racket-a-wake-up-call-on-overdraft-fees/#2715e4857a0b206a7b0d9581. 
178. Compare Barbara S. Mishkin, Rep. Maloney Urges CFPB to Limit Overdraft Fees
and Expand Opt-in Rules, BALLARD SPAHR L. FIRM BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2014/09/11/rep-maloney-urges-cfpb-to-limit-overdraft-fees-
and-expand-opt-in-rules/ (urging a uniform cap on overdraft fees), with Barrington, supra 
note 177 (capping overdraft fees can cost customers more money as banks raise others fees to 
make up for lost revenue). 
179. Rutherford, supra note 17.
180. See Dougherty, supra note 103.
181. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 52.
182. The de minimis waiver prevents overdrafts on small amounts.  See WHITE PAPER,
supra note 49, at 53 (“In layman’s terms, de minimis thresholds prevent instances in which a 
consumer may be charged a $35 fee overdrawing his or her account while buying a $3 cup of 
coffee.”). 
183. Barrington, supra note 177 (denying a form of banking service to customers).
184. WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 54.
185. Id. at 53.
186. Rutherford, supra note 17.
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recommendation of contacting recidivist consumers should be adopted, 
since it sufficiently addresses this problem.187  As long as the consumer 
is informed, which is the goal of the CFPB, then the consumer still has 
the freedom to choose to overdraft.188 
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION
Tension exists regarding whether regulation is needed for 
overdraft protection programs.189  One on hand, the market can police 
various issues such as creating competitive fees.190  If one bank’s fee is 
too high, consumers can go to a competitor offering a lower fee.191  The 
CFPB is essentially relying on the notion that if “you know better, you 
do better.”192  On the other hand, the quote “when people show you who 
they are, believe them”193 characterizes the “8.3[%].”194  These 
consumers are informed of the consequences of their actions, but 
continue making poor financial choices.195  The problem lies between 
consumer choice and paternalistic regulation. 
Barring the banking shuffle and implementing better disclosure 
requirements will create a better overdraft protection program while 
recognizing the consumer’s right to make informed decision without 
government interference.196  People need access to money in case of 
emergencies, which, for some, may include enjoying their morning 
coffee.197  Thus, informed customers can make a rational decision about 
187. GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 6.
188. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 30, at 23.
189. See David Pommerehn, Consumers Lose If CFPB Overshoots on Overdraft, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 10, 2015). 
190. See Checks and Balances: 2014 Update, supra note 135 (charting and examining the
overdraft services of different banks in the U.S.). 
191. Id.
192. Maya Angelou, American poet (abridging from original quote “Do the best you can
until you know better.  Then when you know better, do better”). 
193. Lesson 13: When People Show You Who They Are, Believe Them (OWN television
broadcast Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.oprah.com/oprahs-lifeclass/When-People-Show-You-
Who-They-Are-Believe-Them-Video. 
194. DATA POINT, supra note 47, at 11–12.
195. Id.; see also CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Expensive Overdraft
Charges, supra note 2. 
196. Elvina Nawaguna, U.S. Republicans Oppose Proposed Overdraft Rules for Prepaid
Cards, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-usa-
regulations-banking-overdraft-idUSKBN0M008020150304#hI8QVJ2SIs5uvTBS.99. 
197. See Gail Hillebrand, What’s Your Status When it Comes to Overdraft Coverage?
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Blog (Feb. 22, 2012), 
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opting in to the overdraft protection program.  In this context, the 
Federalist Society says it best, “freedom of contract is most likely to be 
more efficient than regulation when consumer preferences are 
heterogeneous and knowledge of one’s needs is highly personal.”198  If 
people are continuing to choose the opt-in program, the CFPB should 
respect the consumer’s informed decision.  For the consumer’s sake, the 
banking shuffle stops here. 
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